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Abstract
Nothing Has changed Since Yesterday
Robert T. Pollard
Dr. Shuangteng Zhang,
Department of Computer Science
In recent years there has been a seeming resurgence of political radicalism such as
the alt-right and openly socialist groups that have coalesced around former presidential
candidate Bernie Sanders. This sudden resurgence of radicalism has often been blamed
on Social Media and its perceived ability to create echo chambers and help these groups
organize. The goal of this paper is to refute the idea that social media is the sole cause of
this recent wave of radicalism by building a framework of radicalization agnostic of
social media, and then to explore how social media interacts with that framework. The
paper then provides potential solutions for reforming social media platforms to minimize
what role they do have in radicalization
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Introduction
On August 12, 2017 the Unite the Right Rally was held in Charlottesville,
Virginia. The rally was an explicitly white supremacist gathering that saw violent clashes
between the attendees and anti-fascist groups gathered to protest the event, culminating in
the death of anti-fascist protestor Heather Heyer after one of the alt-right attendees
slammed his car into a group of protestors. In the immediate aftermath of the event the
media turned its eyes on the suddenly mainstream alt-right and asked how a group of
mostly young men this large had become inculcated with radical white supremacist and
fascist ideology. While no complete consensus was found, a common perspective placed
the blame on social media, especially on YouTube and its algorithmic content curation,
which were accused of creating platforms that aided the spread of extremist ideologies
while insulating users from opposing points of view. In much of the academic literature
that investigated this informational model and found it to hold true, the blame for
radicalization was placed almost solely on the structure of social media platforms like
YouTube and on the consequences of their algorithmic content curation. Going into
research for this thesis I held essentially that same view. However, it became apparent to
me in the course of my research that radicalization cannot be solely blamed on some
aspect of social media structure. The attitude that the modern radical movements, be they

2

the alt right or radical Islam or any other variety of extremist, can have their origins
blamed solely on the rise of the internet age and the birth of social media, is short sighted
at best and dangerously simple at worst. What became apparent to me is that social media
itself has no special property that radicalizes people directly, it is instead a catalyst that
accelerates a process of radicalization that is endemic to society at large.
The academic literature on the topic of social media and its role in radicalization
is somewhat limited simply due to the relative nascency of social media as a technology.
The most expansive body of work is focused on the role of social media in recruitment
for Islamic terrorist organizations, and that work typically takes a very simple approach
of identifying recruitment techniques and identifying ways they might be countered by
law enforcement, intelligence, or military authorities. Little consideration is given to the
question of what leads to radicalization in these studies, instead they simply discuss the
most surface level examination of how radicals market themselves to potential radicals.
This isn’t a useless study, as the tactics used by radicals to recruit new members play a
role in radicalization and are relevant to counter terrorism efforts, but it doesn’t examine
how or why a person goes from “normal” to extremist, an oversight that I believe keeps
the tactics used to counter these recruitment attempts at a level that is weak, and will be
explained later, incapable of solving the problem in the long term. A smaller set of
literature is focused on white supremacists, and this literature does tend to ask how and
why an individual ends up part of these extremist movements, but as was mentioned
above there is a tendency to find an easy scapegoat in singular causes, typically social
media, though not always, but still fail to approach a wholistic answer. There is very little
literature covering left wing extremists, such as anarchists or communists, and most of it
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is focused on the Occupy Wallstreet movement, which while certainly radical to some
extent, pales in comparison to militant leftist groups. There is seemingly no meaningful
literature on what causes radicalization in general, instead focusing on specific radical
groups as discussed above. This thesis seeks to provide a more wholistic explanation of
the causes of radicalization and to then explain how social media interacts with those
causes to amplify and heighten them, speeding up the process.
Before beginning the main body of this paper, it is necessary to discuss a few
concepts and terms that are important to understand. First among these is the concept of
neutrality and the question of what radicalization, as a systemic process, is. An easy way
to model radicalization might be to simply assume some politically neutral individual has
some force act upon them that causes their radicalization. This is an overly simplistic and
problematic model however. First, this hypothetical neutral person is just some subject
that is acted upon by the world around them. This is unrealistic, real people are not
inactive subjects, but rather agents capable of action and decision making. Second, the
idea of a politically neutral individual is itself ridiculous, as the only such persons are
infants and very young children who do not have a capacity to comprehend politics yet.
While the process by which a child comes to possess some political leanings is certainly
something worthy of study, it is not the aim of this this thesis, rather, this thesis is
focused on how individuals who are at least adolescents, and as such likely have some
concept of politics, come to hold political beliefs that are considered radical. It is possible
for a child to be reared in such a way that they can be said to have always been radical
politically, but that isn’t the same as the process this paper interrogates, wherein someone
shifts from one political alignment to another, ending up aligned with radical right or left
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wing ideologies. This requires a person with some sort of politics, namely adolescents
and adults. People at this stage in their lives are political actors in their own right and
while they might lack a robust or nuanced understanding of politics, they have beliefs and
can act on them. It is at this stage that radicalization as this paper intends to talk about it
occurs.
The process of radicalization at this stage is then not one of forces acting upon a
neutral subject, but rather an active subject acting upon the world and being acted upon in
turn. Action can be understood in this context to be limited to ideologically motivated
action, anything from the voicing of a political opinion to direct political action like a
protest or demonstration, or even acts of violence in the name of an ideology. A reaction
is simply an action made in response to the action of another person. The process of
radicalization can then be said to be a complex chain of action and reaction, with each
individual in a society acting upon one another as they come into contact with each other,
with the end result that some individual shifts their political beliefs into the realm of what
would be deemed radical. This of course raises the question of what is deemed radical in
the first place. There is no set answer to this question, as it is based solely upon the norms
of a given society. There was a time when women’s suffrage or the emancipation of
slavery would have been seen as radical, but in modern American society the very
opposite is true. In other eras the concept of democracy, now a normal and respected part
of political life, would have been radical in its own way. For these reasons it is necessary
to define what is meant by “radical ideology.” Within the American context, radical
ideology refers mainly to white supremacists, religious extremists, communists,
anarchists for the purposes of this paper, and for the sake of simplicity white
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supremacists will be used as a primary example, though the model proposed in this paper
is not specific to that particular ideology.
Another important concept to consider is that of “real life” and its supposed
opposite, “online.” This paper will at various points compare a process in “real life” to
the same process “online” explaining how some element of the internet interacts with it.
This is a shorthand meant to show the difference between a social interaction conducted
face to face or in a physical place and one conducted on a social media platform. In
reality the “online” world is as much a part of “real life” as any physical interaction could
be, the divide between the two is simply a cultural construct born from the idea that the
internet is somehow a space separate from the world at large. This is sort of mysticism
around the internet in my opinion, complicates any discussion of the internet and how it
has impacted society since it came to prominence. That said, what divide actually does
exist between the two, namely the difference in how social interaction occurs in the two,
is relevant to this particular topic, though even that line becomes hazier when one
considers that “real life” political action can and often does lead to “online” action and
vice versa. The actual interplay of the two spaces, in so far as they are distinct, is a topic
too complex to cover in much depth in this paper.
A final piece of terminology to be considered is that of “inculcation.” In this
paper I will use the term “inculcate” to refer to any instance in which a person adopts the
view point of another. This is meant to avoid the misuse of the word “radicalize” when
discussing shifts in ideology, as not all such shifts will result in a person becoming
radicalized. It is also meant to illustrate the social nature of radicalization. Most ideas and
knowledge do not spring fully formed from the ether into our heads, instead they come to
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us from other people, most often direct social interaction or through media like books or
film. Even new ideas are dependent upon prior knowledge to some extent, typically by
following an idea to its logical conclusion, or identifying some flaw in an ideology and
attempting to work out a solution. It can therefore be argued that most ideology is gained
either in part or in whole via inculcation from another person either directly, in a social
interaction, or indirectly, through some media produced by that person. In this way it can
be said that ideology changed through inculcation of new information.
Finally, before reaching the body proper, an important tool of analysis must be
discussed. This is Actor-Network Theory. Actor-Network Theory is a framework for
modeling social interaction that imagines actors within system as nodes connected
through their actions upon one another. Actor-Network Theory allows for anything, not
just people, to be considered actors. This allows for a model that considers not just how
individuals act upon one another, such as they might on a social media platform, but how
the platform itself can be understood to act on each person using it. Obviously an
accurate Actor-Network for a platform like Facebook would be enormous, comprising of
literally millions of actors to represent each user, but a simplified network with fewer
actors can be used to illustrate the sort of social interactions that occur on Facebook each
day and how the platform itself can accelerate the rate at which interactions that lead to
inculcation of new ideas and/or radicalization of users.

7

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 1, above, illustrates one of the simplest possible Actor-Network, Actor A
and Actor B. The double line connecting the two demonstrates that they are acting upon
one another equally. Actor A and Actor B could be any two people discussing some issue
between themselves, each influencing the other more or less equally. Figure 2 illustrates
another simple Actor-Network, again with only two Actors, Actor A and Actor B. The
arrow illustrates that Actor A is acting upon Actor B, while Actor B does not act upon
Actor A. Think of this as an interaction between a radio host and his audience. Actor A is
the host whose words act upon the audience, while the audience is a passive listener with
no real influence on the host. If the host expresses a political position, that expression is
an act upon the audience, and while they can react in a myriad of ways, they cannot do
anything in their capacity as a passive listener to equal the host’s action. More complex
diagrams will be used to explore other forms of social interaction later.
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Factors of Radicalization
Moving now to the main body of this paper, the structure shall be as follows; first
there will be a discussion of what social factors lead to an individual becoming
radicalized. In short, this will cover various social phenomena that play some part in the
process of radicalization. Second, aspects of social media networks will be examined
with the intent to define how they accelerate or amplify the effect of the social
interactions discussed earlier. Finally, this paper will examine solutions attempted by
social media platforms to combat the radicalizing factors they enable, as well as present
new solutions that might succeed where others have failed.
First and foremost, among the different social factors that contribute to
radicalization is recruitment. Recruitment in this context is meant to refer not just to
active attempts to convince someone to join a specific group, but also to any attempt to
convince an individual of some idea. Obviously not every interaction that involves an
attempt to convince someone of some idea is an attempt to radicalize that person, but it is
important to remember that radicals have an agency of their own and that they have an
active interest in turning people to their own point of view. They may do so through any
rhetorical means and there is no guarantee of success, someone may just as easily reject a
radical idea as accept it, but this should be recognized as the chief event through which
radicalization can occur. Typically attempts at recruitment will exploit factors inherent to
society or environment an individual inhabits. Perhaps the most famous instance of this is
the employment of anti-immigrant rhetoric wielded to bring the poor and impoverished
over to the side of white supremacists, arguing that the incoming immigrants will threaten
the jobs and personal safety of those targeted for recruitment. Especially in a bad
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economy, a moderate person who feels threatened in some way, perhaps fearing the loss
of his job or a supposed rise in crime in his neighborhood, could come to be swayed by
the racist rhetoric of a white supremacist. While that might not make the person in
question an out and out Nazi, it would represent a shift toward the radical white
supremacist school of thought and given enough time and enough exposure to that
rhetoric, he may come to accept their school of thought fully, especially if the media he
prefers already leans toward anti-immigrant politics. It may not be as outwardly racist or
extreme, but if a right of center news source were to continually raise fears about
immigration while a white supremacist continued to push the more extreme rhetoric, the
person in question might begin to see the extreme rhetoric as a logical conclusion of the
more moderate anti-immigrant stance.

Figure 3

Figure 3 demonstrates an Actor-Network of the interaction discussed above. The
Moderate and the Extremist, represented by Actor A and Actor B respectively, act upon

10

one another more or less equally. There is no way to predict how one might affect the
other in the long term, they may simply randomly inculcate one another with a series of
ideas without meaningful shifts in position. But with the inclusion of the right-wing news
media represented by Actor C, which acts upon the Moderate without the Moderate
acting upon it, the situation is unbalanced. The Moderate individuals now has multiple
actors pressing him in the same ideological direction, one of which is a news outlet with
at least some measure of prestige and authority attributed to it by the Moderate. This
unbalanced network presents a higher chance of radicalization of the moderate actor than
a more balanced network like Figure 1.

Figure 4

Figure 4 illustrates a similar case to Figure 3, only in this instance we see that the
Moderate (Actor A) is being acted upon by two Extremists (Actor B and Actor C). The
Moderate is also acting upon the two Extremists, while the Extremists are acting upon
one another. This Actor-Network may appear more or less “balanced,” each Actor acting
upon the other, but if we assume that the two Extremists belong to the same radical
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ideology, it stands to reason that their actions upon one another will have no meaningful
impact upon their ideology, as they believe essentially the same thing. Because of this,
Figure 4 is very similar to Figure 3 in its overall effect. The Moderate is alone, being
acted upon by two ideologically similar actors. Because the Extremists are a united front,
the chances of the Moderate’s actions upon inculcating them with more moderate
ideology are lessened, while the chances of their actions inculcating the moderate with
extreme ideas are increased.

Figure 5

Figure 5 is again similar to Figure 3 and Figure 4, only now we have two different
types of radicals, a White Supremacist (Actor B) and a Communist (Actor C). Because
the two are of different radical ideologies, their actions upon one another are not nullified
as actions of the two ideologically similar Extremists in Figure 4’s actions were. The
Communist and White Supremacist act upon one another as much as they act upon the
Moderate. This model may have a sort of equilibrium, wherein the three Actors cannot
meaningfully inculcate one another in a way that results in meaningful change, but it may
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also result in another kind of unbalance. Consider for a moment, a possibility brought up
earlier, that the Moderate may harbor some sort of racist belief that makes him
susceptible to white supremacist recruitment. Now consider also that that same Moderate,
having been born and raised in the United States, may also harbor an inherent distrust of
communism as an ideology. Because of this, this moderate especially unsusceptible to
communist ideology. In that instance, Figure 5 may be more accurately represented by
Figure 5.a.

Figure 5.a

In figure 5.a we see that the equilibrium of Figure 5 is broken, the Moderate is no
longer acting upon the White Supremacist, to whom the Moderate favors, and is instead
only acting upon the Communist, to whom the Moderate is disfavors. This leaves the
communist outnumbered, with two Actors acting against it. This could lead to the
communist being inculcated with either moderate or white supremacist ideas and shifting
ideologically, but that’s not the interaction I hope to highlight. Rather, with the Moderate
doing nothing to oppose the White Supremacist, he is now even more susceptible to
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inculcation with White Supremacist ideology. Minor predispositions towards the two
opposing types of radicals has made the presence of both a boon to the White
Supremacist, who can exploit the disfavor for the communist to more easily recruit the
Moderate, inculcating him with further extreme ideas using the obvious presence of the
Communist as an argument for why such beliefs are justified. In this way extremists can
aid an opposing extremist ideology even when actively attempting to oppose it. Figure
5.a also shows that labels like “Moderate” can be deceiving, even if they accurately
represent an individual’s political leanings, as a moderate can still have a slight lean
toward the left or right of political ideology that could lead them to pick one extremist
over another when confronted with two radical ideologies.
Figures 3 through 5.a represent a small selection of Actor-Network models of
potential recruitment scenarios among potentially infinite permutations. The goal of these
models is to both to illustrate some basic dynamics of recruitment as a social
phenomenon and illustrate some basic mechanics of the Actor-Network as it is being
used here. The next section of this paper will reexamine the examples considered above
in a context where they are occurring in an online space. For the purposes of modeling
these, it will be assumed that the actors are using multiple social media platforms in their
daily lives. Social media platforms will be abstracted to some extent, with their different
elements, such as a content curation algorithm, being represented as separate actors from
other elements of the site, such as content creators. While any social network could itself
be displayed as a single actor, splitting each network into elements that are each treated
as actors will allow for the a more nuanced examination of how exactly the many moving
parts of these enormous platforms impact the process of radicalization.
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Impact of Social Media on Radicalization
To begin, consider Figure 3 in the previous section. In Figure 3 it can be seen that
an extremist and a news network are acting upon a moderate, weighing the odds in the
favor of radicalization. Now consider Figure 6 below.

Figure 6

Figure 6 represents a modified version of Figure 3, showing a Moderate (Actor A)
being acted upon by an Extremist (Actor B), and instead of a traditional news source, an
extremist content creator on some platform, and the content curation algorithm of that
platform (Actors C and D, both colored blue to show that they are interrelated). On its
face this is already an unbalanced model, with even more Actors acting against the
Moderate than before, but an important element of this new model is the interplay of the
Content Creator and the Content Curation Algorithm. The Content Curation Algorithm
actively amplifies the Content Creator, showing the Moderate more and more of the
Content Creator’s content as the Moderate consumes it. The algorithm is built to
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encourage the Moderate to consume the creator’s content again and again as this
repetitive activity is a large part of how the social media platform makes it money. The
algorithm then goes a step further, recommending not just the one content creator, but
any content creator that the algorithm deems similar enough to potentially grab the
Moderate’s interest. In this case, the most similar creators will likely be other extremists
with content pushing their extreme beliefs. This is shown in Figure 7, where several
overlapping actors represent multiple content creators. Their collective actions upon the
Moderate are amplified by the algorithm’s continual act of recommending these content
creators to the Moderate. The chances of the Moderate to consume this content increases
with time, and if the content is consumed, it represents a potential inculcation. When
combined with the further influence of an Extremist actively engaging the Moderate, the
odds of inculcation and eventual radicalization increase tremendously as the weight of
radical ideology bears down upon the Moderate. Now of course it is possible that the
Moderate will reject this ideology, stop listening to the content creators, and stop
speaking to the extremist, but the model in Figure 7 assumes that the Moderate isn’t in an
active opposition to these ideologies, but rather is exposed to them while viewing the
content in question for entertainment purposes and while having more or less normal
exchanges with the Extremist where politics are but one topic.
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Figure 7

Referring to previous models once again, consider Figure 5. It shows a potential
equilibrium as two opposed extremists act upon one another and a Moderate
simultaneously. In an online space this interaction can occur identically to how it was
presented before, but it can also become modified based on how a social media platform
interacts with users.
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Figure 8

Figure 8, seen above, represents one such modification. In this model, the
previous triangle of actors exists, but now a Curation Algorithm is acting upon each actor
in turn. This curation algorithm serves to “encourage” conversation, showing each of the
other three Actors public facing conversations occurring between the other two. This
means that at any point, the three could join an ongoing conversation, derailing what was
already ongoing, something that might prevent the Moderate from becoming inculcated
with a radical ideology, but may also interrupt the proposed balance the two opposing
extremists represent, with one butting into a conversation to tear apart an argument that
might have kept the Moderate from taking a side meaningfully. Another possibility is that
the algorithm shows an argument between the two extremists in which one of them,
possessing superior rhetorical skill, appears as the winner. In this way an argument made
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in real life the Moderate might never even see is made obvious to him, and seeing one of
the two deeply opposed sides come out as the winner of a debate, he may be inculcated
with some element of that ideology, or with a favorability toward the winning extremist
that makes them more susceptible inculcation of extreme ideologies, essentially setting
up the situation modeled by Figure 5.a.
Moving on now from the subject of recruitment as a vector for radicalism, there
are two more minor vectors that are key in bringing someone to become a radical. These
are economic conditions and environments. A desperate person is generally more willing
to take extreme actions to meet their needs or solve their problems than someone who is
secure and calm. While many factors can lead someone to become desperate, a common
cause of desperation is economic condition. An individual who is in poverty, or feels as if
they are threatened with poverty, can easily become desperate the moment something
places stress upon them. The threat of basic needs like food, water, and shelter being
taken away, or already being scarce, weighs heavily on them. In these conditions people
can be quick to turn to any source for a solution, be a material one or an ideological one.
The stress of those economic conditions might lead them to seek to blame some party for
their condition, and this is where many radical ideologies find a foothold, often providing
an answer of who is to blame for their harsh conditions or else giving them a salve for the
stress inflicted by their conditions through religious succor in the case of extremist
religious groups. There is a sense of community, unity, and purpose inherent to radical
groups that draws in the needy and the desperate and can make them into dangerous
extremists. This should not be taken as a statement that the poor are all likely to be
radical or at risk of becoming so, but rather it is an observation that poverty can act to
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increase the chance of radicalization. In a nation like America, where even the very poor
often have access to the internet, they are even more likely to make contact with radical
ideas and become inculcated with them.
Economic condition is but one part of a broader cause of radicalization,
environment. This term could be taken to mean literally ever factor of an individual’s
environment, from climate to local demographics, but in this context it means the
political environment, the mixture of political ideas and identities represented in their
family, community, and beyond. This environment could conceivably be expanded to
encompass geopolitical factors that span the globe and affect entire nation states, but the
exact reverberations of such events are difficult to quantify, especially when it comes to
their exact effect on individuals. For the purposes of this paper environment is limited
mainly to the communities to which an individual belongs. The most immediate of these
is likely to be family. A family that is right wing is likely to influence a member toward
right wing thought, especially in the case of the influence parents have on children. But
the opposite can also occur, a child can rebel against the norms and turn toward other
politics as they mature. A left wing family might find that their child has become strongly
right wing, perhaps even moving so far to the extremes that they now hold radical beliefs.
Communities other than the family, such as schools, workplaces, social clubs, etc can
impact an individual as well. The need to fit in, or simply continual contact, unavoidable
due to circumstances like employment can lead to inculcation via either ready acceptance
or the eventual wearing down that comes with hearing something day in and day out.
Social media, by definition, provides access to communities online, and the interplay of
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online community and real life community can be complex and very effective in driving
someone toward extremism.
Consider the aforementioned example of the rebellious child moving in an
opposite direction of their parents politically. The internet serves as an easy way to
facilitate such a turn, providing access to numerous spaces where this child, who is
willing to break from their parents, might find people saying exactly the sort of thing they
want to hear to validate their own opinions. This search for validation may make them
very susceptible to inculcation with radical ideas, as they may come to see the people
who validate their beliefs as authority figures whose ideas should be readily accepted.
This can bring them into a situation where the need to fit in also plays a role, as pressure
to match the prevailing ideology of an online community’s in group may lead to
inculcation with radical ideology. Another situation in which a need to fit in can come
into play is nonpolitical communities, such as a community centered around a video
game. If the prevailing political ideology of such a group skewed radical, a new player
may find himself inculcated with that radical ideology simply because the vast majority
of people who share his interest in that video game are also radicals.
Online communities can also undergo collective radicalization under the correct
circumstances. When a group has a prevailing ideological predisposition and is to some
extent insular and invested in its own group identity (i.e. video game enthusiasts who, as
a group, assign some value to being enthusiasts) members of the group can react
negatively when that predisposition is challenged, especially if the challenge is from a
perceived outsider. For example, in 2014 a movement known as Gamergate arose in
response to a perceived incursion upon a video game enthusiast community who
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members had a strong investment in their identity as gamers. Gamergate was a harsh
reaction to the attempts by several feminist writers to provide meaningful feminist
critique of what they identified as sexist trends in video games. The movement began as
an attempt to refute these critiques, which were unpopular with the predominantly rightwing gamer community. It evolved from heated refutation to virulent anti-feminism and
outright harassment of those who were perceived as invading the community’s space and
threatening its identity. Because the feminists were viewed as radically left wing by the
gamers, they were utterly unwilling to consider leftwing viewpoints, even if they were
more or less moderate. By contrast, the gamers were more than willing to accept radical
right-wing ideas from nearly anyone who could package it with a critique of the feminists
they had come to despise. A number of right-wing figures, including former White House
advisor Steve Bannon, used the event to begin inculcating large numbers of these gamers
with radical right-wing ideologies, typically white supremacist ones. This sort of insular
tribalism and harsh reaction is not unique to online communities, it can and has happened
in real life numerous times. Real life reactions like this are often hindered in their scale
and effect by the simple logistics of organizing a large number of people, but online
thousands of people can easily come together to carry out aggressive, politically
motivated action with relative ease, as finding a particular user account is trivial and it
takes only moments out of someone’s day to write an aggressive message to that account.
The energy needed for the group to act as one was reduced substantially by acting online
and as such the ability for this movement to spread its farther and effect more people was
increased. The radicalizing effect of the movement was therefore much greater online
than it could have hoped to have been in real life. The environment communities like
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these create is a tense and polarized one, one that stands to repulse as many people as it
pulls in, pushing them to take on radical views to the opposite of the problem group.

Solutions
Now that the factors behind radicalization and the ways in which these factors are
aided and amplified by the internet have been discussed in full, potential solutions can be
discussed. This section will focus mainly on the internet and social media and how they
can be shaped to lessen their impact on radicalization, as the processes that lead to
radicalization are themselves inherent to society and social relations, it is basically
impossible to solve some of these problems on that level. But the internet is a constructed
thing, a tool and infrastructure that can be altered. Perhaps not easily or quickly but
reforming it so that it no longer has such an impact on radicalization would hopefully
contribute to a safer and healthier society and as far as cybersecurity is concerned, would
lessen many of the security threats that originate on the internet. While solving poverty or
ending racism would be wonderful and magnificent achievements that would deal a
serious blow to radicalism, no such achievement is likely in the next decade, but
restructuring a social media platform so that it cannot be used to spread racist rhetoric is
achievable within that same time span if not less time.
One obvious place to start with these platforms is their overall structure.
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and many others are designed with algorithmic content
curation in mind. The function of these algorithms is simple, they show users content
that, based upon previous user actions, they can deduce the user will like and importantly,
that will keep the user engaged and actively using the platform. While the function is
simple, the actual inner workings of these algorithms is complex and ever changing, a
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convoluted mire of machine learning that will just as often show a user 30 things she’s
seen already simply because nothing new and closely fitting can be found. All this is in
service of showing the user ads, which are the lifeblood of the platforms and are often
algorithmically curated themselves in order to effectively target users with ads that will
appeal to them. As discussed earlier, this sort of algorithm is also responsible for aiding
in user radicalization. Restructuring these platforms to avoid the use of these algorithms
is likely one of the most effective measures that could be taken to reduce a platform’s
capacity to radicalize people. However, it is meaningless to simply say that a
restructuring must happen, any structure could replace the current one and be just as bad
or worse. So what sort of structure is best suited to slowing these radicalization? The
answer is messy. Obviously one could conceivably strip a platform down to its bare
bones, remove public profiles, algorithmic curation, the ability to share someone else’s
post, etc, but that leaves you with something that just isn’t a social network, and the goal
here is to restructure a platform so that it is a safer form of social network. One social
network worthy of examination is Reddit.
Reddit is structured as a series of distinct forums called subreddits. Users can
make posts on a subreddit which are then directly voted for or against by the users, called
upvoting (similar to liking a post on Facebook) and downvoting (similar to disliking a
video on YouTube). Comments can be made on a post and these comments can also be
upvoted or downvoted. A typical reddit post will be an image, video, or piece of text at
the head, with a several chains of comments discussing the content of the post and often
subjects related to it. Reddit is by no means an exemplar of perfect platform design, as it
has struggled with moderation due to each subreddit being moderated almost exclusively
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by volunteers, but it has been shown that some element of Reddit’s structure is actively
harmful to the ability of radicals to unite and organize as movements (Buyukozturk et al,
2018). Unfortunately, Buyukozturk was not able to explain what mechanism within
Reddit was directly responsible for this hindrance, their best guess is that, while Reddit’s
structure actively encourages engagement in discourse, it does not focus that engagement
in a way that creates consensus. Radicals bicker among themselves as often as they argue
with those opposed to one another and thus fail to present a cohesive front that organize
in a more effective manner than flinging abuse at those few individuals they can all agree
are bad. This doesn’t make them any less radical, simply less dangerous due to the lack of
organization and amount of energy wasted fighting amongst themselves rather than
performing actions that might radicalize others.
One notable element of Reddit’s structure that might be responsible for hindering
radicals is its subreddit structures. Unlike some platforms, Reddit uses no algorithm to
recommend or show content to a user in its default state, rather the user populates a feed
with content of their choosing by subscribing to different subreddits. this means that a
user can only be exposed to the content of a subreddit if they are subscribed and while the
site does recommend new subreddits, it doesn’t show the content of those subreddits, it
simply lists their names and links to them. Further, any discourse, where most ideological
exchanges are going to happen, happens in the comments, which can be completely
ignored on many subreddits as the bulk of the content is images or videos, often with
little in the way of the political content if any. In short, if a user wants politics, especially
radical politics, they must seek them out actively. This means that even if a user find
himself inculcated with some radical ideas after reading through a few comment threads,
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he might not know where to find a community of people with the same radical ideas and
won’t be pulled further into radicalization. Further, as Buyukozturk points out, reddit is
extremely open for debate and discussion and its comment system can allow for
conversations that are going nowhere to continue for a long time, allowing for completely
frivolous and time-consuming arguments over tiny things. This propensity for nitpicking
keeps meaningful ideological discussion from arising. Taking these features into
consideration, a better structure for social media may then be one where content is selfcurated, similar to how Reddit users choose which subreddits to subscribed to, and one
where discourse is encouraged and open to an extent that is actually forms a hindrance to
the movement of ideas. Reddit shows such a model can be profitable and successful,
though as stated it isn’t perfect.
One thing to understand about many of these solutions is that they cannot be
implemented without a full investment of the platform itself. This is part of why the
issues pointed out in this paper have festered for so long on so many different social
media platforms, implementing a solution directly threatens the profitability of the
platforms. Take YouTube as an example. YouTube is infamous for its content curation
algorithm, which is designed not just to show a user content they might like, but also to
instill a habit of continual engagement, rewarding content that gets more engagement
over longer periods with more exposure. The algorithm is continually being fine tuned of
course, only so that it is better at encouraging the user behavior that is most profitable.
The same user behavior that sends people down rabbit holes of extremist content and
helps radicalize them. So while the solutions I suggest here could very well help a
platform like YouTube escape from the continual accusations of hosting radical content
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and perhaps even solve other issues with the platform like gaming the algorithm for
engagement, but it would require YouTube find a new business model profitable enough
to make the transition worthwhile, which is itself a problem I am not qualified to even
attempt and solve.
One way that these platforms could begin to address their radicalizing effects
would be to dispense with their attempt to remain ideologically neutral. Often, in order to
avoid bad press or simply to dodge the messy issue of publicly believing in something,
social media platforms will try and play the neutral party. As discussed at the very outset
of this paper, the idea of a politically neutral individual, or in this case corporation, is
utterly laughable. While Facebook may not have a meaningful stake as an entity in
whether a Democrat or Republican is in the White House, it does have a stake in its own
profitability, and that means it has an interest in politics, typically in regards to its ability
to lobby for intellectual property protections and other such methods of shoring itself up
against potential losses to competitors, but politics all the same. Lawmakers, activists,
and the general public can use this reality to push platforms like Facebook to
acknowledge that they are political entities, and to then hold them accountable for their
politics. In this way, stronger measures against radical content can be put in place. This
solution avoids the issue of changing the business model to slow radicalism by pressuring
the platforms with the potential loss of profit continued bad press represents. However,
this solution is limited both in that it ultimately doesn’t fix the structural problems at
work on these platforms, and in that the threat of bad press will only go so far against
these platforms. There is no good way to hold them accountable in the long term or to

27

ensure that changes put into place are actual fixes and empty gestures meant to appease
critics.
Another solution that doesn’t necessarily require a change in business model is
moderation, though it is one rife with issues. Most major platforms make use of a
combination of automated and manual moderation, with an algorithm detecting certain
forbidden material (typically copyrighted material posted without permission) and
removing it automatically, while human moderators deal with any specific reports of
forbidden activity, as they can judge with better clarity than an algorithm whether or not a
particular statement should be considered harassment or not. There are problems with
both types of moderation. First, the algorithms typically lack precision or nuance, as
mentioned before, and can easily strike down entirely inoffensive content because it
resembles just enough something forbidden. Notably, the platform Tumblr banned
pornographic content and used a fully automated system to identify and remove it. The
system was mocked mercilessly for its tendency to flag any image of a human being as
pornography, or in some cases images of things like flowers. Now obviously more
sophisticated algorithmic systems exist, but they still run into the same problems often
enough that they are less than reliable in most circumstances. Meanwhile, manual
moderation has a number of problems of its own. While a human is more than capable of
perceiving nuance where a machine would fail, they have their limits. Often the teams of
moderators employed by a platform are simply too few to handle the load of reported
information received by them. Thus work hours become grueling and exhausting
affecting the ability of a moderator to even do their job correctly. Meanwhile, a great deal
of the content they must review is deeply traumatizing to work with, even without taking
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potentially disturbing content made by extremists into account. Videos of extreme
violence are typically disallowed on most platformed and thus moderators will often find
themselves forced to view such content when it reported. Obviously an algorithm might
be able to catch these sorts of videos and relieve the human moderators of that particular
strain, but as stated before these algorithms are not perfect. If they miss something it will
reach the human moderators, and that’s assuming they even target the correct content to
begin with, they could very well fixate on harmless content like clips from horror and
action movies that do not violate any platforms rules and meanwhile leave the human
moderators to deal with the actual problem. Finding a solution to the failures of these two
moderation forms is tricky. A combined approach of algorithmically filtering certain
content has the exact flaws I discussed above, and while a platform might hire more
human moderators, there is only so much extra manpower can accomplish. Consider
Facebook, which has literally millions of active users, or YouTube, where hundreds of
hours of video are uploaded within a single day. The scale that these platforms reach is
enormous and seemingly in many ways unmanageable. This may partly go back to the
structure of the platforms and the way they incentivize user behavior through their
content curation. Reddit is a sizeable platform in its own right with millions of users that
uses mainly volunteer moderators within each subreddit to keep order. Now this isn’t a
perfect system, it opens the door for moderators to becomes tyrants over certain
communities and volunteer moderators for subreddits of radicals are unlikely to be
anything other than radicals themselves, which only allows for those communities to
fester and spread their ideology until higher level action is taken by site admins.
However, going back to how Reddit’s structure may have certain advantages over other
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platforms with regards to hindering radicalization, this approach to moderation may
present a solution to the issue of human moderation and algorithmic moderation.
Specifically, a combination of the three methods could serve to alleviate the
shortcomings of all three. First, the volunteer moderators can keep the vast majority of
prohibited content from circulating, including keeping tabs on political discussion when it
does arise. Next, the algorithm can handle issues like copyright infringing posts so long
as close human eye is kept on them to prevent erroneous removal. Finally, human
moderators employed by the platform can handle any content that gets past the volunteers
and the algorithm, which should be a much lighter load and less prone to being
traumatizing. However, as stated before, the volunteer system only works on a platform
where specific community spaces exist, which is not the case on most platforms, except
in a limited form (such as Facebook groups). Secondly, this three-tiered approach to
moderation would require a bit of specialized engineering to ensure that volunteer
moderators who might want to promote certain content can’t act in a manner that
prevents the employee moderators from seeing it. Again, not a perfect system, but
possibly one that would work well to not only prevent various other forms of digital
detritus from getting onto various sites, but also to help corral and control radicals so that
they pose less threat of radicalizing others.
One solution that I have come across with regards to platforms like Twitter and
Facebook is to nationalize them, removing the profit incentive from their operation and
allowing for a total restructuring to prevent radical ideology from spreading. This is
potentially a decent solution, but it depends heavily on how the government operates the
platform. It would be incredibly easy for censorship to run rampant on these platforms
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under these circumstances, and given the prevalence of these platforms in most people’s
lives, especially with regards to how they get news, it would pose a serious threat to
democracy if an incumbent president had meaningful control over these platforms. There
is also the issue of these platforms having users from nearly every nation on earth,
meaning that making it the property of one nation could give that nation an outsized
influence on international media.
Where the nationalization idea fails due to inherent issues of giving a specific
state control of a platform as omnipresent and influential as Facebook or Twitter, there
may be something to be said for the removal of the profit motive from the proceedings.
As stated above, the elements of these platforms most responsible for radicalizing people
are tied directly to the need to produce profit. If Facebook or Twitter were to be
converted into an independent, but not profit driven organization it could present a
chance for restructuring, transparency, and genuine progress on fixing the amplifying
effects of the platform. Of course, there are two huge problems with this solution as well.
First, the amount of money necessary to support platforms of this size is enormous and
difficult to come by unless they are seeking and producing profits as well as pulling in
investment capital. Second, it would be a titanic effort to get these companies to change
to a nonprofit model of operation when they stand to generate incredible profits as is.
This leaves us at an impasse. Most of the solutions suggested here require large
scale restructuring or either platform architecture or business model or else a total break
from for profit operation. At the beginning of this section I stated that solving the societal
factors that create radicals to begin with was either impossible or nearly so, depending on
the factor in question, and now at the end of the discussion of how to solve the
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amplifying effects of social media it seems mountains must be moved to affect
meaningful change here to, and that is true. However, where solving the problem of
poverty or the flow of dangerous ideas through society without stopping the flow of ideas
itself are problems that have been met with not true solution throughout the whole of
human history, the problems posed by social media have only exists for a little over a
decade. Corporate entities with incredible reach have existed before and have been made
to change for the betterment of society before. In another decade’s time the changes I
have discussed here could in part or in whole, have been put into place to great effect and
to the betterment of society. They may not be easy solutions or perfect solutions, but
given the right drive from activists, law makers, and the public at large social media can
be shifted to serve its purpose as a virtual space for connection and communication
without creating waves of radicalization that harm society at large. The approach must be
one of pragmatism, not pessimism and with some luck things will change for the better.

Conclusion
Radicalism is, as I have said, a difficult thing to define as the question of what is
radical has much to do with the attitudes of the society that asks the question. Radicals
are an inevitability of society, one that can threaten its current structure, sometimes for
better but often for worse. While no society can eliminate radicals, it can combat them
via many methods and in the modern age it is necessary to combat them in the virtual
space of the internet, to prevent them from perverting the greatest means for information
exchange to ever exist for the purposes of violence and hate. As someone who hopes to
work in cyber security after college I feel it is important to look not just at how I can help
protect computer infrastructure from various threats or how I can use my skills to
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investigate crimes committed with or on a computer, but also how I can use my
understanding of the internet, its technologies, and its industry to improve it overall, to
make it a safer, better space to exist socially and to maintain its function as a tool of
information exchange. The political movements birthed on the internet can be both
positive and negative forces, and those that are negative represent what I see as an
inevitable price of the free flow of information. Ideas cannot be killed and so even the
most heinous of them can persist and find purchase, especially in the collective spaces of
social media, where millions of people are connected at once. The title of this paper,
Nothing has Changed Since Yesterday, is meant to communicate that the issue of modern
day political polarization and renewed radicalism are not the result of a shiny new
technology in the form of social media, but of inherent functions of society. We cannot
change the fact that humans are social animals, that we have biases, or that we exchange
information, and if that is true radicalism of different stripes will exist. What role the
internet does play in this modern political landscape is one of amplification, its structure
serving not to replace or invent new forms of social interactions, but to heighten what
already exists, to increase the rate at which they occur and the speed at which someone
can become completely absorbed into a subject. This can be a good thing, when it brings
someone into a new hobby or helps them discover some new aspect of themselves, but
often it is not, instead serving help indoctrinate people, most often young teens, with
radical and dangerous ideology.
To conclude, I hope that this paper has served to elucidate you on the nature of
radicalization as a phenomenon and to help you understand better how the role the
internet plays within that nature. Hopefully it will motivate you to pay close attention to
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social media platforms, how they are managed, how they change, who is using them, and
for what purpose. I hope also that it will motivate you to support efforts to reform and
improve these social media platforms. I believe that these platforms can be a great boon
to our society, but only if they undergo intense work to improve and to rid themselves of
what hopefully, will one day be seen as growing pains for these platforms.
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